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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff-Appellee, J 
v. : 
HENRY LEE, 3 
Defendant-Appellant. \ 
i Case No. 920566-CA 
\ Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(7) 
(Supp. 1992). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as the appeal 
is from a district court in a criminal case not involving a 
conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly authorize a no-knock 
entry for purposes of carrying out the search? 
A magistrate's authorization of a no-knock search is 
held to be improper only if the warrant affidavit, read as a 
• * . 
whole, fails to support an inference that if the searching 
officers first announce their purpose, evidence may be lost, or 
physical harm may result to any person. See State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-
10 (1990)), rev'd on other grounds. 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 
1992). Thus deferential review of no-knock authorization is 
appropriate. 
2. Was the affidavit complete and sufficient to 
establish probable cause? 
Appellate courts are "obliged to pay great deference to 
[a] finding of probable cause" and does not make a de novo 
review. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 832 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Was the affidavit sufficient to establish probable 
cause under the state constitution? 
The question of whether the state constitution requires 
less deferential review is a policy question, and hence one of 
law. 
4. Did the trial court correctly determine that there 
was probable cause to arrest defendant? 
A trial court's ruling on probable cause to make a 
warrantless arrest is not reversed on appeal "unless it clearly 
appears that [the trial court] was in error." State v. Rocha, 
600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (quoting State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 
2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972)). Accord State v. Bartlev, 784 
P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1988) ("the trial court committed no 
clear error either in its denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress or in its finding of probable cause to arrest"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 27, 1991, defendant was charged with 
possession of heroin, a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8-(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1992)1 (Record [hereafter R.] at 10-11). The case was bound 
over to the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel, district judge, presiding (R. at 
23). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming that 
it was obtained in violation of both the federal and state 
constitutions (R. at 27-30). 
A hearing on the motion was conducted on June 15, 1992 
and the court issued a minute entry that day, denying the motion 
(R. at 43 and 39-41). As directed, the prosecution prepared 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the 
judge's decision (R. at 57-61). On June 17, 1992, defendant 
entered a guilty plea2 to attempted possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
SS 57-38-8(2)(a)(i) and 57-38-8(7) (R. at 48 and 64). The plea 
was conditioned on defendant's right to pursue this appeal of the 
suppression denial (R. at 50). Defendant was sentenced and 
placed on probation (R. at 64). 
Citation is to the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8 which does not vary in any significant way from the statute as it 
read at the time defendant was charged. 
defendant's signed statement indicates his plea was one of 
"no contest.,f 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 24, 1991, a search warrant, with 
accompanying affidavit, was presented to and 'signed by a 
magistrate of the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County 
(Exhibit #1; a copy of the warrant and affidavit is attached as 
Addendum A). The warrant authorized search of the person of 
Verra [sic] Mason and an apartment in Salt Lake County and 
authorized seizure of cocaine, heroin, drug paraphernalia, 
currency, and documents regarding occupancy of the apartment and 
drug purchases. Details of the affidavit will be included in the 
argument portion of this brief. 
After receiving the signed warrant, Brad Bassi, an 
agent of the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, in concert 
with other agents and agents of the federal Drug Enforcement 
Agency, executed it at the apartment named (R. at 88-90).3 The 
agents were wearing jackets which identified them as peace 
officers (R. at 102). Pursuant to the no-knock authorization of 
the warrant, the officers pushed the outer door open, identified 
themselves as police, then entered the living area (R. at 101, 
91). Continuing to identify themselves, they quickly moved 
through the apartment, securing each room as they went (R. at 
91). As they entered the hallway leading to the bedrooms, they 
ordered anyone in the bedrooms to come out. At that point, "the 
left arm of Mr. Lee started to appear";• he was ordered out of the 
3Citation to the transcript of the,suppression hearing is to 
the stamped record pages at the bottom of each page rather than to 
the internal pagination of the transcript. 
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bedroom and onto the floor (R. at 92, 104-105). The officers 
went in to the bedroom and found another man lying on the floor 
next to the bed (R. at 92, 106-107). In the room were three 
needles, "heroin cut in pieces on the plate lying on the bed, a 
knife on the plate, various drug paraphernalia, spoons, [and] 
packaging material laying on a small table" (R. at 93). At one 
point, agent Bassi noticed "fresh [needle] track markings" on 
defendant's arm (R. at 107-108). He also saw symptoms of heroin 
ingestion; defendant was "having a tough time staying awake. We 
call it nodding off." (R. at 119-20). Defendant was arrested 
and taken to the jail where syringes were found during a search 
of his person (R. at 115). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No-knock authorization for executing the search warrant 
was proper because the affidavit established that at least two of 
the occupants of the apartment had arrests or convictions for 
weapons and controlled substance offenses. In addition, the 
affiant had stated that, based on his experience, the drugs being 
used and sold in the apartment were easily disposable. The 
affidavit established both statutory justifications for issuance 
of a no-knock authorization. 
The two facts that defendant argues were omitted from 
the affidavit were not material to tiie -finding of probable cause. 
If the facts that one of the confidential informants was on 
probation and had a prior drug offense had been added to the 
affidavit, the magistrate would still have determined that 
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probable cause existed to search. Those facts would not have 
caused the magistrate to believe the affiant was lying when the 
affiant swore that the informant had not received any benefit for 
providing the information. Neither would they have caused the 
magistrate to disbelieve that the informant had told the affiant 
that the informant had purchased drugs at the apartment. 
This Court should not adopt the two-pronged "Aguilar-
Spinelli" test under the state constitution in this case because 
defendant has presented no compelling reason to depart from the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. In addition, the trial court 
found that this affidavit would meet either the "Acruilar-
Spinelli" test or the totality test. 
Probable cause to arrest defendant was based on his 
presence in the room where heroin was being prepared and 
injected, the fresh needle marks in his arm, and the outward 
signs of his having injected heroin shortly before the officers 
arrived. Since probable cause existed, his arrest and the 
subsequent personal search were reasonable and the syringes found 
during the search were admissible evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED "NO-KNOCK" 
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant contends that th£ magistrate erred in 
authorizing conduct of the search on a "no-knock" basis. Under 
the correct standards of review and proof for no-knock 
authorization, this argument should be rejected. 
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A. No-Knock Warrant Authorization Should be 
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness. 
By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play 
only "[w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . .." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990).A Its focus is not probable cause, but 
only the question of how the search will be conducted. See State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock challenge did 
not assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry"); 
State v. Soisak, 520 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1974) ("In Ker v. 
California [374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (1963)], the 
court held that where there was justification for the officer's 
failure to give notice under the particular circumstances, this 
method of entry was not unreasonable under the standards of the 
Fourth Amendment"). For a no-knock search, the statute requires 
"proof" that if the search is announced, evidence "may" be lost, 
AThe full text of the statute reads: 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, 
the officer executing the warrant may use such 
force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority and 
purpose, there is no response or he is not 
admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in ,the warrant that the 
officer need not giVe ' notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result 
to any person if notice were given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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or that personal physical harm "may" result. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-10(2). 
Defendant emphasizes the statutory "proof" requirement 
in a state constitutional portion of his argument (Brief of 
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 18). This Court rejected a 
similar argument in State v. Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(Utah App. Jan. 13, 1993), when it stated: 
The criteria for issuance of no-knock 
searches found in Utah Code Annotated section 
77-23-10(2) is less stringent than that 
required for the initial probable cause 
determination. . . . Because the affiant is 
placed in a position of predicting the 
potential for future events, he or she must 
necessarily rely on training, experience, and 
any information gathered from confidential 
informants or other reliable sources. 
Id. at 6 n.2. Officer belief or experience unrelated to the 
particular case, by itself, probably should not justify no-knock 
authorization. However, so long as some case-specific evidence 
supports it, a magistrate's no-knock search authorization should 
be deferentially reviewed, and reversed only if it is clearly 
unreasonable. There are sound policy reasons for this deference. 
By definition, a search warrant defeats the privacy 
expectation of the subjectfs] of the search. There is no 
question of consent; the search is going to occur even over 
resistance. In their expertise, the searching officers can 
anticipate the likelihood and form of such resistance, whether 
efforts to conceal the sought-after contraband, physical 
resistance to officer entry, or both. In carrying out the 
warrant's command to enter a particular place and seize 
-8-
particular things, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1990), officer 
expertise about how to best follow that command should be 
respected. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. 
Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978) (question of how to conduct warrant-
authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of the 
executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement). The 
language of Utah's no-knock search statute properly allows the 
magistrate to respect that expertise; reviewing courts, in turn, 
should defer to the magistrate's no-knock authorization. 
Where probable cause exists, it is reasonable to 
believe that the criminal suspects wish to thwart any search. 
The element of surprise may be needed to overcome the suspects' 
efforts toward that end. A request for no-knock search 
authority, providing that element, should not be overscrutinized, 
especially where the nature of the criminal activity—such as 
cocaine and heroin dealing—facilitates easy destruction or 
secreting of contraband. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33 
(Utah App.), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah Adv. Rep 14 (Utah 
1992) (small amounts of drugs suspected).5 Compare State v. 
Pierson, 238 Neb. 872, 472 N.W.2d 898, 903 (1991) (search for 
slot machine; no-knock entry not needed). 
Finally, a no-knock search will often be advisable for 
physical safety reasons. In general, ".American criminals have a 
5But see State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-67 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), and State v. Valento, 405 
N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. App. 1987) (showing of large-scale 
operations supported no-knock authorization). 
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long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country 
many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and 
thousands more wounded." Terry v. Ohio, 392 tJ.S. 1, 23, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968). More specifically, Utah courts have noted 
that drug dealers are often armed. State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 
1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 670 n.9 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 
P.2d No. 920140 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992). Accord People v. 
Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Colo. 1989). Further, in Utah, 
possession of firearms for "defense of . . . property" is 
constitutionally endorsed. Utah Const. Art. I, § 6. The 
likelihood of violence upon an unconsented home entry, especially 
where criminal activity is already suspected, is therefore very 
real. 
Accordingly, when law officers have obtained a warrant, 
and thereby assumed a duty to search a given place, their request 
to enter the place on a no-knock basis should be granted if it is 
reasonable. No-knock authority should be refused, or reversed on 
review, only if no evidence particular to the case at hand, 
gleaned from the warrant affidavit as a whole, supports it. See 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-33. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Upheld the Magistrate's 
No-Knock Search Authorization. 
Under the foregoing standard/ the magistrate's no-knock 
authorization should be reaffirmed on appeal. "When this court 
reviews an affidavit authorizing no-knock entry, we do so in a 
common sense manner, viewing its contents as a whole." State v. 
-10-
Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (citing Rowe, 806 P.2d at 
732). Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 allows no-knbck authorization 
when there is evidence that the object of the search may be 
quickly disposed of or evidence that harm may result to any 
person if notice is given. The affidavit in this case 
established both grounds. 
The first basis for issuance of no-knock authorization 
is the assertion that a confidential informant (CI) "has stated 
that when agents from AP & P [Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole] conduct home visits at the named premises, persons inside 
the named premises flee from a side exit, for fear of being 
arrested for possession or use of narcotics." (Addendum A, 
affidavit at p.2). 
A further basis for no-knock is that the ingestion and 
sale of controlled substance "has been ongoing for several 
months." (Addendum A, affidavit at p.3). The affiant stated that 
he knew "from training and experience that the items sought 
[drugs and paraphernalia] pursuant to this search warrant are 
easily destroyed, hidden or altered." Further, any delay would 
"allow additional quantities of heroin and cocaine to be sold." 
(Addendum A, affidavit at p.4). 
No-knock authority was also supported as a matter of 
safety. The affiant, Agent Bassi; was '.the supervising parole 
officer for Joseph Dowell, an occupant of the apartment to be 
searched. From review of Dowell's file, Agent Bassi knew that 
Dowell had an arrest for armed bank robbery, burglary, and at 
-11-
least four arrests for distribution of a controlled substance. 
(Addendum A, affidavit at p.3). The agent ha4 also been informed 
that Vera Mason, another occupant of the apartment, had a prior 
arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses. (Addendum A, 
affidavit at p.4). In State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the reasonableness of precautions 
when officers "enter hostile environs." Jd. at 293-94 (citing 
Terry). A home that is to be entered pursuant to a probable 
cause finding is presumptively "hostile." Therefore, even 
uncertain evidence that the occupants were armed formed a 
sufficient basis to authorize searching officers to take 
precautions. 
Defendant makes much of the fact that Dowell had been 
arrested sometime before the warrant was executed (Br. of App. at 
12). If Dowell's criminal history were the only basis for 
authorization of no-knock entry, this argument might have had 
merit; however, the method of entry was based on the facts: 1) 
that the CI had previously seen people flee when parole officers 
arrived for home visits; 2) drugs are easily and quickly disposed 
of; and 3) Vera Mason also had a prior arrest for weapons and 
drug offenses. Viewing the affidavit as a whole, it "provides a 
sufficient basis for issuance of a no-knock warrant on either of 
the two statutory grounds." Rosenbaum, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
Defendant cites a Washington case holding that hearsay 
information about weapons forms an insufficient basis for no-
knock search authority. State v. Schmidt, 48 Wash.App. 639, 740 
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P.2d 351, 355 (1985) ("An informant's statement that the 
defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient")., Schmidt overstates 
the quantum and reliability of proof that should apply to the 
taking of safety precautions when executing a search warrant, and 
appears to contradict the Utah view in State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 
1380, 1381-83 (Utah 1986) (handcuffing of defendant in residence 
to be searched was "extreme" but not unreasonable given concerns 
for officers' safety). Therefore, it should not be considered 
persuasive. 
Other cases state that evidence of the presence of 
firearms reduces the safety justification for no-knock authority. 
State v. Piller, 129 Ariz. 93, 628 P.2d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 1981) 
("knowledge of the existence of a firearm excuses compliance with 
announcement requirements only where the officers reasonably 
believe the weapon will be used against them"); People v. Dumas, 
109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (1973). Such cases seem 
to proceed upon a premise that law officers, given a choice, will 
choose a more dangerous search method over a safer one. This 
"self-destructive officer" premise is unsound. 
Defendant cites other cases that seem to assert that 
persons suspected of drug dealing upon a probable cause finding 
retain the same search and seizure protections as do ordinary 
citizens. State v. Pierson, 238 Neb. 872, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902 
(1991). This is untenable. Citizens wno are not suspected of 
crimes cannot be subjected to any unwanted police intrusions. 
Their rights cannot be compared to those of people whose "right 
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to be let alone" has already been overcome by a judicial probable 
cause finding. See People v. Ouellette, 78 1,11.2d 511, 36 
111.Dec. 666, 401 N.E.2d 507, 512 (1979) (Underwood, J., 
dissenting). 
The cases cited by defendant also implicitly presume 
that appellate judges, who do not conduct searches, are better 
able than law officers, who do conduct them, to decide the safer 
means of carrying out this activity. Again, the dissent in 
Ouellette is more persuasive: "Were I the officer obliged to 
search the occupied apartment of one possessing, and perhaps 
using, drugs, and reasonably believed to have a gun, I think I 
would prefer not to be warned of my arrival." 401 N.E.2d at 513 
(Underwood, J., dissenting). 
Finally, cases from other jurisdictions that strictly 
limit no-knock searches run contrary to Utah policy. In State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that citizens have no right to forcibly resist even an unlawful 
police search, and indeed are criminally liable if they do so. 
Id. at 572-76. This search was lawful because of the underlying 
warrant. Consistent with Gardiner, the search cannot then become 
unlawful merely because officers anticipated that occupants of 
the apartment might unlawfully resist it, and took reasonable 
measures to defeat or prevent such resistance. 
In sum, though the risks of evidence loss and physical 
danger in an announced search were not certain, they were 
sufficient to justify precautions. In proper deference to the 
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officers, the magistrate, and the trial court, this Court should 
reaffirm the no-knock authorization in this search warrant. 
C. Nominal allusion to state constitutional analysis 
is not sufficient to trigger independent analysis. 
Defendant alludes to the state constitution and asks 
the Court to suppress under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. In a brief conclusory argument, he quotes this 
Court's opinion in Rowe for the proposition that Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-106 establishes procedures for protection of substantial 
rights; consequently, suppression was an appropriate remedy for 
violation of the statute. First, as argued above, the statute 
was not violated. Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
Rowe decision on precisely that point. On certiorari, the 
supreme court said: 
The erroneous addition of nighttime authority 
in the search warrant issued in this case did 
not rise to a fundamental violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights, but merely constituted a 
procedural violation of section 77-23-5. 
Such a procedural violation requires 
suppression of evidence obtained only where 
it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or 
a lack of good faith on the part of the 
police. 
. . . In order to show prejudice, defendant 
must establish that absent the nighttime 
entry, "the search would not otherwise have 
occurred or would not have been so abrasive 
if the Rule had been followed." 
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Sep. 28, 1992) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sfchoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 
(8th Cir. 1988)). A violation of the no-knock statute is also 
6However, Rowe dealt with Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5, nighttime 
execution of a warrant, rather than § 77-23-10, no-knock execution. 
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procedural and, under either the federal or state constitution, 
suppression would not be an appropriate remedy even if the 
statute had been violated. 
D. No good faith exception analysis is appropriate. 
Defendant argues that the good faith exception does not 
apply in this case; however, this issue was never raised or 
addressed in the trial court. Neither is the State relying on 
that exception at this point in the proceedings. 
Because the trial court determined that the search 
warrant was validly based on an affidavit which established 
probable cause, no argument was ever made about the good faith 
exception. On appeal, the State maintains that this 
determination should be affirmed; however, if this Court 
concludes that the trial court was in error and that the 
affidavit did not establish probable cause, the State asks that 
this matter be remanded for development of a record upon which an 
analysis of good faith may be made. 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS VALID BECAUSE NO MATERIAL 
MISREPRESENTATIONS OR OMISSIONS OCCURRED. 
Defendant contends that the affidavit did not establish 
probable cause because the agent left out material facts which, 
if added, negated a probable cause finding (Br. of App. at 25). 
As a general matter: 
A magistrate may issue a search warrant if 
there is probable cause to believe that the 
property to be seized was either unlawfully 
acquired or unlawfully possessed. . . . 
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Probable cause is to be determined by the 
totality of the circumstances. • . . 
Under this analysis, the magistrate must 
"make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the 'veracity' and basis of knowledge of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place." . • . 
Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure 
that the magistrate had a substantial basis 
for concluding that probable cause existed. 
. . . 
In reviewing the magistrate's 
determination of the sufficiency of the 
affidavit, we are obliged to pay great 
deference to the finding of probable cause 
and we do not make a de novo review. 
In determining the probability that the 
evidence is where the affidavit says it is 
likely to be found, the magistrate need not 
decide whether it is more likely that the 
evidence may be elsewhere or whether a more 
prudent thief would have chosen a better 
location or would have moved it there more 
promptly. Rather, the affidavit need only 
address the probability of a specific 
location. 
State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 832-33 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 
(1983); other citations omitted). As this Court noted in State 
v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 
45 (Utah 1989), both the federal and state constitutions require 
that warrants be based on probable cjause. "Whether an affidavit 
for a search warrant meets the probable-cause standard is 
determined by the "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis of 
[Gates.]." id. at 1109. 
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In reestablishing the "totality of the 
circumstances" test, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the former "Aguilar-
Spinelli" test as "hypertechnical and 
divorced from [reality]." 
• • • 
To dissect the affidavit, fact by fact, is 
exactly the "hypertechnical" review the Gates 
test was reestablished to eliminate. 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365-66 (Utah App.) (quoting and 
citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33, 104 S. Ct. 
2085, 2087-88 (1984)), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Specifically regarding a claim that pertinent material 
was omitted from an affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court, in State 
v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 
107 S. Ct. 1565 (1987), adopted the federal test for evaluating 
the validity of a search warrant. 
In Franksr v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. 
Ct. 2674 (1978)], the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity 
of a search warrant if the defendant can 
establish the (i) an affiant in an affidavit 
supporting a search warrant made a false 
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause after the 
misstatement is set aside. [438] U.S. 171-
72. By an extension of reasoning, the same 
test applies when a misstatement occurs 
because information is omitted; the affidavit 
must be evaluated to determine if it will 
support a finding of probable cause when the 
omitted information is inserted. . . . [I]f 
the omission or misstatement materially 
affects the finding of probable cause, any 
evidence obtained under the improperly issued 
warrant must be suppressed. . . . The 
obvious purpose of Franks and its progeny is 
to avoid suppressing evidence when the actual 
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facts, if known to the magistrate, would have 
resulted in a finding of probable cause. 
Id. at 191 (citations omitted). 
The information defendant claims was omitted from the 
affidavit was: 1) that the confidential informant was on 
probation; and 2) that the informant had at least one prior 
conviction for drug offenses (Br. of App. at 25). Agent Bassi 
testified to this information at the suppression hearing (R. at 
98-99). Defendant's argument that this information was material 
and that it's addition defeats probable cause is based on certain 
assumptions that this Court should not make. Defendant argues 
that this information bears on the reliability of both the 
informant and Agent Bassi. Agent Bassi, under oath, affirmed 
that he had neither promised nor paid the informant anything and 
that the information given by the informant was against the 
informant's own penal interest; the informant had purchased drugs 
at the apartment. (Addendum A, affidavit at p.3). Defendant 
argues that if the magistrate had known the informant was on 
probation, the magistrate would have "take[n] into consideration 
that probation officers have considerable power and control over 
probationers[,]" and "would have noticed that the logical 
consistency of the[] statements [that the probationer would have 
voluntarily told a probation officer that he had broken the law 
without first being promised something]' was suspect." (Br. of 
App. at 26). Defendant has presented no evidence that Agent 
Bassi lied under oath about no promises to the CI and yet that is 
what he asks this Court to assume. To argue that the agent must 
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have lied under oath and the magistrate would have believed the 
agent to be lying if the magistrate had known' of the informant's 
probationary status is improper and highly offensive. Unless 
defendant can present some evidence that the agent lied under 
oath, he ought not ask this Court to assume that the agent did 
so. 
Rejecting the implication that Agent Bassi lied about 
the informant being given and promised nothing for the 
information, the fact that the informant was on probation and had 
a prior drug-related conviction was not material to the probable 
cause finding. The informant had been inside the residence and 
had seen cocaine and heroin being sold; the most recent 
observation had been three days before. The informant was aware 
that Vera Mason had been selling drugs out of the residence for 
"a long period of time," and Joe Dowell had been helping her for 
approximately a month-and-a-half. (Addendum A, affidavit at 
pp.2-3). The informant had personal and recent knowledge of drug 
possession and distribution at the apartment to be searched. 
The reliability of the informant was established by the 
fact that he had not been paid or promised anything for the 
information and his statement that he had purchased drugs at the 
residence was against his penal interest. A statement against 
penal interest is presumed to be truthful because people usually 
do not lie in order to implicate themselves in criminal activity. 
See e.g., Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). 
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In addition to the information provided by the 
confidential informant, the agent had information from another 
informant through a second probation officer. 
The use of hearsay evidence to establish 
probable cause does not necessarily undercut 
the validity of a warrant. If the hearsay is 
reliable, and there is a substantial basis 
for giving it credence, it will support the 
issuance of a warrant. . . . In addition, 
there is a presumption that law enforcement 
officers will convey information to each 
other truthfully. . . . Therefore, double 
hearsay between police officers is not fatal 
on its face to the validity of a warrant. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192 (citations omitted). Probation officer 
Harvey Van Katwyk had relayed to Agent Bassi the information 
which came from one of Van Katwyk's probationers. The 
presumption that law enforcement officers will convey information 
to each other truthfully applies here. Van Katwyk relayed the 
basis of his probationer's knowledge as being first hand and as 
recent as within the previous two weeks. The observation was of 
three people using and selling cocaine and heroin at the 
residence. Two of the three named people were also named by 
Bassi's confidential informant as persons using and selling drugs 
at the apartment. Van Katwyk established the reliability of his 
informant on the bases that the probationer had not received or 
been promised anything for the information and the probationer 
was concerned about a friend who had been buying and using heroin 
at the apartment. (Addendum A, affidavit at p.2). 
Taking the affidavit as a whole, the court's finding of 
probable cause is correct. Defendant's attempt "[t]o dissect the 
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affidavit, fact by fact, is exactly the 'hypertechnical' review 
the Gates test was reestablished to eliminate." Miller. 740 P.2d 
at 1366. 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS VALID UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
Defendant asks this Court to adopt a strict "informant 
reliability" approach to probable cause and search warrant 
issuance under the Utah Constitution (Br. of App. at 34-36). 
This approach is called the "two-pronged" "Aauilar-Spinelli" 
test, after Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509 
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 
584 (1969). In essence, the approach requires that when a search 
warrant request is supported by informants' statements, the 
informants' "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" must be 
established for the magistrate. See Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 
213, 228 nn.3-4, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2327 nn.3-4 (1983). 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
strict "informant reliability" approach, adopting instead a 
common sense-based, "totality of the circumstances" approach 
under the fourth amendment. 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S Ct. at 2332. 
This approach has been embraced by Utah's appellate courts. See 
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29r3(F (ytah App. March 11, 1992). 
Informant reliability does remain a factor in the "totality" 
analysis. Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1101; Purser. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 29; accord Gates. 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S. Ct. at 2328. 
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However, where informant reliability is unsure, other factors can 
compensate, establishing probable cause. See, State v. Bailev, 
675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (police investigation 
corroborated informant's tip). 
Defendant argues that under Article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, informant reliability should be a sine flua 
non for probable cause and search warrant issuance. However, 
Utah courts have expressed no dissatisfaction or difficulty with 
the "totality" approach. Compare State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
466, 469 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (finding federal 
automobile search law "intolerably confusing," and attempting to 
"simplify" it under the state constitution). Accordingly, there 
is no compelling reason to depart from the Gates totality of the 
circumstances test.7 
Defendant cites a number of cases that reject the 
totality of the circumstances approach, retaining an Aquilar-
Spinelli informant reliability requirement under state 
constitutions. Often, however, that requirement has been 
retained in name only, with the courts holding that informant 
reliability problems can be overcome, and probable cause 
established, through independent police investigation. See State 
v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 144 (1984). Thus this 
7Indeed, this Court has appliecj the test to search warrants 
under Article I, section 14. See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 
1365 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). But see 
State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 & n.l (Utah App. 1989), and 
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109 & n.2 (Utah App. 1988) 
(applying the test but noting absence of separate state 
constitutional analysis). 
-23-
decision actually represents a totality of the circumstances 
approach. 
Other cases deal with warrants issued solely upon 
informant statements, with no independent investigation. E.g., 
People v. Griminqer, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988) 
(but failing to address fruits of earlier consent search as basis 
for probable cause); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Alaska 
1985); People v. Sherbine, 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d 658 
(1984).8 These cases properly demonstrate that where informant 
statements are the only basis for probable cause, the informants 
must be reliable; this requirement is retained under the totality 
of the circumstances test. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205 ("even 
under [the Gates] standard, compliance with the Aauilar-Spinelli 
guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for 
probable cause"). 
In the present case, the trial court determined that 
the affidavit was sufficient "even if the two prong 'Aguilar-
Spinelli' test were applied." (R. at 40, Addendum B; R. at 60, 
Addendum C). This conclusion was correct as demonstrated by the 
argument in Point II, above. 
8The cases often warn that^ the informant reliability 
requirement should not be "applied* hypertechnically," State v. 
Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989), or with "unthinking 
rigidity," State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30, 35 (1989). 
The tendency to so interpret the requirement was a factor in the 
federal adoption of the Gates totality of the circumstances 
approach. Massachusetts v. Upton. 466 U.S. 727, 732, 104 S. Ct. 
2085, 2087 (1984). 
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POINT IV 
THE ARREST OF DEFENDANT WAS BASED ON PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
Defendant's final argument is that his arrest was 
unlawful and the syringes found on his person at the jail should 
be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 415-16 (1963). 
The trial court determined that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest defendant. A trial court's ruling on 
probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is not reversed on 
appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in 
error." State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979) (quoting 
State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972)). 
Accord State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1988) 
("the trial court committed no clear error either in its denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress or in its finding of probable 
cause to arrest"). Probable cause to arrest without a warrant has 
been defined: 
"'The determination should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the facts 
known to the officer, and the inferences 
which fairly might be drawn therefrom a 
reasonable and prudent person in his position 
would be justified in believing that the 
suspect had committed the offense.'" 
State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State 
v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 198$);'' in turn quoting State v. 
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972)). 
In a minute entry, the trial court concluded that there 
was probable cause to arrest defendant. The court wrote: 
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The Court is also of the opinion that 
since the defendant was found to be in a room 
where officers observed syringes, heroine 
[sic] on a plate which was, in the * 
terminology used by the officer[,] "cut" and 
presumably ready for use, a knife on the bed, 
spoons and packaging materials[,] that there 
was probable cause to arrest the defendant 
and the evidence obtained from his person at 
a subsequent search at the jail was legally 
obtained. 
(R. at 40; Addendum B). The court subsequently signed findings 
and conclusions, which stated, in pertinent part: 
6. The defendant Lee was found emerging 
from a bedroom where there was a plate with 
eight "chips" of "black tar heroin" along 
with paraphernalia used to "cut" and to 
inject heroin, sitting on top of the bed. 
. . . 
7. Lee was secured by handcuffs, put in 
the kitchen where hypodermic "tracks" were 
seen on his arms, and other indicia of heroin 
intoxication were observed. He was arrested. 
Later, at the jail, hypodermic syringes were 
found on his person. 
• • • 
5. There was sufficient probable cause to 
arrest Lee with his proximity to the heroin, 
his "tracks", [sic] and his outward indicia 
of narcotics intoxication. 
(R. at 59-61; Addendum C). 
These determinations were fully supported by the 
evidence. Defendant had been in the room where the heroin and 
paraphernalia were found until the police ordered him out as part 
of the protective sweep of the apartment (R. at 92, 103-107). 
The parole officer saw fresh needle "tracks" in defendant's arm 
at the time of the arrest (R. at 107-108, 119). The officer had 
dealt with heroin users and specifically persons intoxicated with 
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heroin "many times." One "obvious effect" of heroin intoxication 
is "a sense of not being able to keep their balance, having a 
tough time staying awake. We call it nodding off. And that was 
very specific to Mr. Lee at that time." (R. at 119-20). In 
other words, defendant's arrest was proper because he had been in 
the room where the drugs were located, he had marks on his arm 
indicating recent injection of heroin, and he displayed the 
effects of heroin injection. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /tr day of February, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
HO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the «tate of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Agent 
Brad Basal, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the persons off Verra Mason, A female black adultf DOB, 
3/21/40, 
( ) the vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta Street, (240 
East) , the premises is on west side of the road, the apartment is on the 
southern most half of the four plex, #1, to include all containers, rooms, 
attics, and basements found therein• 
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described 
as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT MAM 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded: 
(X) in the day time 
( ) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown) 
(x) to execute without notice^of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given •) 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR ROCK FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lakef State of Utah, or retain such property in 
your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this day of Pec ,1991. 
JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 0R~ 
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the persons of, Vera Mason, A female black adult, 
DOB, 3/21/40. 
( ) the vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 1442 South, Roberta 
Street, (240 East), the premises is on west side of the road, the 
apartment is on the southern most half of the four plex, #1, to 
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein. 
In the City of SALT LAKE, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property of evidence described as: 
and that said property or evidence: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT 
CONTINUED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR RQCK FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
6. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
7. HEROIN, A BLACK TAR LIKE SUBSTANCE, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Agent Brad Bassi, is employed by the State of 
Utah, Corrections Department, as a Parole Officer, assigned to 
Region Three, ISP. Your affiant has been a sworn peace officer in 
Utah for over 3 years. Your affiant has been involved in law 
enforcement employment for over 17 years in Utah. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. 
Your affiant is investigating an illicit heroin, cocaine, and 
usage case, being conducted at the named premises, by the name 
persons on this affidavit/warrant. Your affiant has received 
information from a two separate sources of information. Your 
affiant, lhas been- told by both sources of information that the 
persons/listed s & using and selling cocaine and heroin at the 
listed premises. 
Your affiant has interviewed Probation Officer Harvey Van 
Katwyk who told your affiant the following. Van Katwyk had been 
told by one of VanKatwyk's probationer's that Jack Sirstins, who 
was reportedly a Federal Fugitive, Vera Mason, and Joe Dowell, were 
all three using and selling, cocaine and heroin at the listed 
premises. Further the probationer told VanKatwyk that the 
observations of the probationer were first hand. Further the most 
recent observation was within the last 2 weeks. The probationer 
observed Joe Dowell using heroin and cocaine. Further the 
probationer observed Jack Sirstins and Vera Mason selling heroin 
and cocaine from the listed premises. 
VanKatwyk believes the information provided by the probationer 
is truthful and accurate for the following reasons. The 
observations were first hand. The probationer has not promised nor 
paid anything for the information. Further the probationer is 
concerned for the welfare of a friend that has been purchasing and 
using heroin at the named premises. 
Your affiant has interviewed a separate source of information 
herein after referred to as CI. Your affiant was told the 
following. CI has been inside the ijamed premises and observed Vera 
Mason and Joseph Dowell's are selling cocaine and heroin at the 
named premises. Further the CI stated that the CI has observed 
Joseph Dowell's using narcotics at the named premises. Further the 
CI has stated that when agents from AP & P conduct home visits at 
the named premises, persons inside the named premises flee from a 
side exit, for fear of being arrested for possession or use of 
narcotics. 
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Your affiant was told by the CI that the most recent 
observation of narcotics sales and usage at 'the named premises was 
on December 21st, 1991. Further your affiant was told that Vera 
Mason and Joseph Dowell were selling " a large quantity of 
narcotics"
 f from the named premises. CI has told your affiant that 
this illicit operation is ongoing, that Vera Mason has been selling 
narcotics out of the premises for a long period of time, and 
further that Joe Dowell has been assisting Vera Mason in the 
illicit operation for approximately 1 1/2 months. 
Your affiant believes that the information from the CI is 
accurate and truthful for the following reasons. Your affiant has /f, 
not promised nor paid the CI anything for the information provided. / ^  
Further CI has made statements against CI's own penal interest. . ,*_ 
£01 SfaXow tfi+JT lit* ftU€^t4U4+4 tUyve^Xi^ **i6**~Sp*X**t*«ix*, v 
Your affiant is the supervising parole officer for Joseph ^ 
Dowell. Your affiant has reviewed Dowell's file and Dowell shows tvio^  
prior arrest for bank robbery, (armed), burglary, and at least 4 QJ^JP** 
prior arrest for distribution of a controlled substance. Dowell is 
currently on parole to the State of Utah for distribution of a 
controlled substance, heroin and cocaine. 
Further your affiant would like to advise the courts that 
Dowell has only been out of prison for approximately 2 months. 
Your affiant knows from experience and training, as a parole 
officer, that parolee's often, return to their criminal habits and 
criminal peer groups. 
Your affiant has been told by two separate sources that Dowell 
is selling and using cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your 
affiant has been told that Vera Mason is also using and selling 
cocaine and heroin at the named premises. Your affiant has been to 
the named premises and have observed both individuals at the named 
premises. Further your affiant is aware that Vera Mason has a long 
history of substance abuse and sales. 
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing and there 
will be additional amounts of heroin and cocaine at the named 
premises. Your affiant has been told that the operation has been 
ongoing for several months. Your affiant has been told that the CI 
has made purchases of heroin from the named premises within the 
last 3 days. 
Further your affiant believe^ that the named premises should 
be searched for drug paraphernalia and packaging material. Your 
affiant believes that these items will be present for the following 
reasons. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these 
items are needed to ingest cocaine and heroin and to weigh out 
additional amounts for resale. Your affiant has been told by two 
sources that they have observed Dowell and Mason use narcotics. 
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Your affiant prays for no-knock service of this warrant. Your 
affiant has reviewed the criminal history of DOWELL and he has a 
prior armed robbery. Further your affiant has been told that MASON 
has prior arrest for weapons and narcotics related offenses. 
Your affiant also knows from training and experience that the 
items sought pursuant to this search warrant are easily destroyedf 
hidden or altered. Further your affiant fears any delay in the this 
service of the search warrant will allow additional quantities of 
heroin and cocaine to be sold. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because: 
see body of affidavit 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
see body of affidavit 
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a SEARCH WARRANT be issued 
for the seizure of said items: 
(X) in the day time. 
( ) at any time during day or night because there is 
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good 
reasons, to wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate)the officer 
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of 
the officers authority or purpose because: 
(x) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given, or 
(x) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed off, or secreted. 
The danger is believed to exist because: 
£u/& 
Brad Bassi 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this s *4 dav of i D ^ ^ ISR/ , 
% Judge "y-—y. ; J - O ^ -
"-In" theJ^ y<j£r>jjcourt 
In and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 921900322 FS 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
HENRY LEE, : 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress was heard by the Court on 
Monday, June 15, 1992. After receiving all of the evidence, 
hearing closing arguments and having taken the matter under 
advisement the Court now rules as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that under the totality of the 
circumstances the magistrate had probable cause to issue the 
warrant. The fact that the affiant obtained a portion of the 
information in the affidavit from another probation officer, who 
had in turn obtained that information in an interview with one 
of his probationers is not fatal to the affidavit. See State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P2d. 188 (Utah 1986). 
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The Court is further of the opinion that even if the two 
prong "Aguilar-Spinelli" test were applied (no longer the law in 
federal constitutional cases) that the affidavit would still be 
sufficient. The Court is of the opinion that the source of the 
information, that is Officer Van Katwyk's probationer and the 
confidential informant, were reliable and that there was a 
sufficiently reliable basis for the information obtained from 
said informants. 
The Court is further of the opinion that there was probable 
cause to issue the warrant as a "no-knock" warrant in that the 
person who was the object of the warrant, according to the 
information received by the affiant, had an ongoing illicit drug 
operation at the premises and had prior arrests for weapons 
offenses. 
The Court is also of the opinion that since the defendant 
was found to be in a room where officers observed syringes, 
heroine on a plate which was, in the terminology used by the 
officer "cut" and presumably ready for use, a knife on the bed, 
spoons and packaging materials that there was probable cause to 
arrest the defendant and the evidence obtained from his person 
at a subsequent search at the jail was legally obtained. 
Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Inasmuch as the hearing on this Motion was held today, June 
15, 1992 and the trial in this case is scheduled for Wednesday, 
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June 17, 1992 the Court has not attempted a detailed analysis of 
the issues or an outlining of the Court's finding of fact. The 
Court therefore instructs Counsel for the State to prepare a 
more detailed set of findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
to submit them to the Court for review. 
DATED this TO day of June, 1992. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this j'.J day of June, 1992: 
Howard Lemcke 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lisa Remal 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/» (U£xUi~~ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE, Bar No. 3729 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
JUL 1 5 1992 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HENRY LEE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921900322FS 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on June 15, 1992, this Honorable 
Court convened to consider the Motion of the defendant to suppress 
items of evidence against him. The defendant was present and 
represented by Lisa Remal of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association. The State was represented by Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney Howard R. Lemcke. The State called one witness, Adult 
Probation and Parole Agent Brad Bassi. The defendant called no 
witness, but moved one exhibit that was admitted, a copy of an 
Affidavit for Search Warrant. Both sides argued the Motion and the 
Court ruled, denying the defendant's motion, making the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. On December 24, 1991, agents of Adult Probation and 
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Parole and the Drug Enforcement Agency, executed a "no-knock", day 
time service search warrant at 1442 South Roberta Street in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The warrant was signed by the Honorable Robin 
Reese, Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court. 
2. The defendant here, Henry Lee, was not a person 
named in the search warrant, but was found along with others in the 
Roberta Street residence when the warrant was executed. 
3. The Affidavit of Probable Cause contained 
information from two individuals, one identified as Agent 
VanKatwyk's Probationer, the other as CI for confidential 
informant. Each stated they had seen either Vera Mason or Joe 
Dowell using and selling narcotics at the listed address at times 
proximate to the application for the warrant. CI stated that his 
occurred on December 21, and that he had, himself, purchased 
narcotics at that residence. Agent VanKatwyk, a category I peace 
officer, spoke to the reliability of his probationer, and Bassi, 
the Affiant, to the reliability of CI. Bassi also spoke as 
Dowell'& probation officer about knowledge of Dowell. 
4. In support of a prayer of "no-knock" service, Bassi 
sighted Dowell's history, which included Armed Robbery, Mason's 
prior history of arrest including weapons and narcotics, and that 
the items sought in the warrant are easily destroyed, hidden, or 
altered, and have the potential to be put out into the community. 
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5. After having the warrant signed by Judge Reese, and 
prior to execution, agents of Adult Probation and Parole were able 
to take Dowell into custody at their office. 
6. The defendant Lee was found emerging from a bedroom 
where there was a plate with eight "chips" of "black tar heroin" 
along with paraphernalia used to "cut" and to inject heroin, 
sitting on top of the bed. Another person, a co-defendant, Kersey, 
was in the bedroom. Vera Mason was also in the residence and was 
charged separately. Another person, not charged, was also in the 
premises. 
7. Lee was secured by handcuffs, put in the kitchen 
where hypodermic "tracks" were seen on his arms, and other indicia 
of heroin intoxication were observed. He was arrested. Later, at 
the jail, hypodermic syringes were found on his person. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Although defendant argues that the Gates, totality 
of circumstances test for probable cause is not met, the Court 
concludes that the information from two sources, each with a 
first-hand basis of knowledge, and articulated reasons for the 
reliability of each source, in combination with the unique 
knowledge of a probation officer, form sufficient probable cause to 
support the warrant and not to overturn the initial findings of the 
Magistrate. 
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2. Although the defendant argued that the two-pronged 
Aouillar-Spinelli test is required by Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah constitution, the Court finds that, even if the 
Acraillar-Spinelli test were applied, the Affidavit in support of 
the Search Warrant is sufficient. The Court finds that the source 
of the information, to-wit: Officer Van Katwyck's probationer and 
the confidential informant, were reliable. The Court further finds 
that there was a sufficiently reliable basis for the information 
obtained from saicj informants. 
3. Although Bassi himself did not interview 
VanKatwyk's probationer, VanKatwyk as a Category I peace officer, 
could appropriately vouch for that person's reliability. 
4. The fact that officers took Dowell into custody 
before they executed the "no-knock" warrant, did not create a 
requirement to return to the Magistrate to re-work the warrant when 
the circumstances of Mason, and unknown others, being present and 
unsecured and the disposable or "flushable" nature of the heroin 
remained in effect and formed a sufficient basis to issue a 
"no-knock" warrant. 
5. There was sufficient probable cause to arrest Lee 
with his proximity to the heroin, his "tracks", and his outward 
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indicia of narcotics intoxication. 
DATED this 1^  day of J»ne\ r?92. 
'JM 
Approved as to Form: 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for the Defendant 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NO*EIj?/N9L 
Third D i s t r i c t Court gji&q&ff 
v -, -/GO*** " 
HRL/sc/0599 
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